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The renewal of early-modern scholarship on the ambassador 
Pierre Ayrault on diplomatic immunity 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The second half of the 16th century saw a profound change in the scholarship 
on the ambassador, which led to its becoming a very significant line of thought within 
early-modern scholarship on ius gentium. This change took many forms. In quantitative 
terms, the number of publications on the subject showed a striking increase, which 
became particularly evident during the 17th century. In terms of methodology, on the 
one hand, the legal humanism and the usus modernus Pandectarum, and, on the other, 
the doctrine of “reason of State”, differentiated the new treatises from those before, 
which had been nourished by the method of mos italicus or consisted of short manuals, 
collecting precepts of behaviour, to be consulted by the ambassadors. Lastly, 
thematically, many arguments were introduced for the first time into the literature on 
the ambassador, or were dealt with from a new, fresh perspective. In fact, the very 
foundations of diplomacy and, more generally, of political power were being radically 
transformed in this period, as is immediately clear when we consider factors like the 
increasing length of diplomatic missions (usually identified as the development of the 
“resident diplomacy”), the rise of the modern state and of the absolutist theory, and the 
explosion of religious conflicts1. 
 Within this context, which clearly cannot be reconstructed here, the jurist and 
humanist Pierre Ayrault appears to occupy a particularly interesting position. Although 
he wrote no monographs on the ambassador, he did devote specific sections of his 
erudite works Decretorum libri (later republished as Rerum ab omni antiquitate 
                                                
1 For a catalogue of the texts on the ambassador written between the 15th and 17th centuries, see Vladimir 
Émmanuilovich Hrabar (ed), De legatis et legationibus tractatus varii, (Dorpat: C. Mattiesen 1906); Id. 
(ed), De legatorum jure tractatuum catalogus completus ab anno MDCXXV usque ad annum MDCC, 
(Dorpat Livonorum (Jurjev): Typis Mattiesenianis 1918); and Daniela Frigo, ‘Political Thought and 
Diplomacy: Towards an Index of Works (1560-1680)’, available at: 
http://www.enbach.eu/content/political-thought-and-diplomacy-towards-index-works-1560-1680. For a 
discussion of the problems connected with the definition of this body of texts, see Jean-Claude Waquet, 
‘Les écrits relatifs à l’ambassadeur et à l’art de négocier: «un genere di riconoscibile omogeneità»?’, in 
Stefano Andretta/Stéphane Péquignot/Jean-Claude Waquet (eds), De l’ambassadeur. Les écrits relatifs à 
l’ambassadeur et à l’art de négocier du Moyen Âge au début du XIXe siècle (Rome: École française de 
Rome 2015), 9-31. More generally, on these texts see also Alain Wijffels, ‘Le statut juridique des 
ambassadeurs d’après la doctrine du XVIe siècle’, Publication du Centre européen d'Études 
bourguignonnes (XIVe - XVIe siècles) 32 (1992), 127-142; Id., ‘Early-modern scholarship on international 
law’, in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International 
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), 23-60; and Maurizio Bazzoli, ‘Ragion di stato e 
interessi degli stati. La trattatistica sull’ambasciatore dal XV secolo al XVIII secolo’, Nuova rivista 
storica 86 (2002), 283-328. Lastly see Dante Fedele, Naissance de la diplomatie moderne. 
L’ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l’éthique et de la politique, PhD dissertation, ENS de Lyon, 
december 2014 (awaiting publication), in which I studied the characteristics and the evolution of the 
scholarship on the ambassador in central and western Europe from the 13th to the 17th centuries. 
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judicatarum Pandectae) and De l’ordre et instruction iudiciaire2 to the subject. 
Ayrault’s work offers a vivid example of the depth of the change occurring at the time, 
particularly in its treatment of diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution: these are 
the observations that we intend to focus on in this paper. However, since diplomatic 
immunity had already been the subject of legal reflection for some time, we will begin 
by outlining the debate from the end of the Middle Ages to the middle of the 16th 
century and then focus on Ayrault’s thought, in order to reveal the originality of many 
of its elements. 
 
 
Diplomatic immunity from the late Middle Ages to the mid-16th century 
The scholarship on the ambassador which developed out of late-medieval ius 
commune was rooted in the de legationibus sections of the Digest and the Codex – 
although in these collections «legatus» referred more to an internal agent whose task it 
was to connect the cities or provinces of the empire with its centre, rather than an inter-
state ambassador3. Over time, jurists extended to the ambassador, through frequent 
recourse to analogical reasoning, a number of rules established in various areas of 
private law (e.g. mandate, society, guardianship, marriage and succession)4. The range 
of actors entitled to send and receive ambassadors was not clearly defined, as was 
typical of Medieval legal pluralism: vassals and even private citizens could do so, either 
on public or private business. According to the Digest, jurists defined the ambassador as 
«sanctus» and therefore considered him inviolable even in times of war, invoking, 
where violation occurred, the punishment of being handed over to the enemy or, on the 
basis of canon law, excommunication5. In principle this privilege was held to protect the 
                                                
2 See Petrus Aerodius, Decretorum, rerumve apud diversos populos ab omni antiquitate iudicatarum, 
libri duo (Parisiis: apud Martinum Iuvenem 1567), liber II, tit. 34 («De Legationibus»), 412-416; second 
edition Decretorum libri VI. Itemque liber singularis de Origine & auctoritate Rerum Iudicatarum 
(Parisiis: apud Martinum Iuvenem 1573), liber VI, tit. 16 («De Legationibus»), 701-709; third edition 
Rerum ab omni antiquitate judicatarum Pandectae (Parisiis: apud Michaelem Sonnium 1588), liber X, tit. 
15 («De Legationibus»), 445r-452r. See also Pierre Ayrault, De l’ordre et instruction iudiciaire (Paris: 
chez Iaques du Puys 1576), 51r s.; revised edition L’ordre, formalité et instruction iudiciaire (Paris: chez 
Michel Sonnius 1588); «edition seconde» (but in fact it is a third edition), with the same title (Paris: chez 
Laurens Sonnius 1598); «edition troisiesme» (but fourth edition), with the same title (Paris: chez Michel 
Sonnius 1604). 
3 See Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC – AD 337) (London: Duckworth 1977), 
chap. 7; Anthony Bash, Ambassadors for Christ. An Exploration of Ambassadorial Language in the New 
Testament (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1997), 9 and 71; and Andrew Gillett, Envoys and 
Political Communication in the Late Antique West, 41-533 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2003), 6, 9-10, 22-23. One exception can be found in D. 50.7.18(17), concerning diplomatic immunities 
granted to «legat[i] hostium». 
4 For a more detailed discussion, see Fedele, Naissance 2014 (n. 1), 61-284, 656-672. See also Donald E. 
Queller, The Office of the Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1967). 
5 See Dig. 1.8.8 and Dig. 50.7.18(17), which are cited from at least the end of the 12th century, as the de 
legationibus section of Pillius de Medicina’s Summa Trium Librorum proves: the text is quoted by 
Rolandus de Lucca in his own Summa and can be read in Emanuele Conte/Sara Menzinger, La Summa 
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ambassador wherever he was, in other words not just in the country to which he was 
going but also in those through which he had to travel6. Bartolus de Sassoferrato and 
Baldus de Ubaldis numbered such violations among the offences that made up the crime 
of laesa majestas7 and, with Giovanni da Legnano, they exempted the ambassador, his 
possessions and the members of his suite from reprisals8. As for immunities, jurists 
established that (1) the ambassador was not obliged to pay taxes in the country in which 
he was carrying out his function, with regard to all goods connected with the fulfilment 
of his mission9; (2) he enjoyed the privilege of full restitution (restitutio in integrum) 
provided by Roman law in favour of all those who were away from home on public 
service (rei publicae causa); and (3) during the mission he could neither be accused of, 
nor punished for, any crime committed before he took office, nor could he be obliged to 
repay any debts incurred at that time10. They did, however, place certain limits on 
immunities, holding the ambassador to be liable for debts incurred and offences 
committed during his mission11 and determining that his privileges were lost if he 
deceitfully prolonged his stay in the mission country, thus delaying his return to his 
                                                                                                                                          
Trium Librorum di Rolando da Lucca (1195-1234). Fisco, politica, scientia iuris (Roma: Viella 2012), 
236-237. Regarding canon law, see c. 9, d. 1 (on the «legatorum non violandorum religio») with the gloss 
legatorum, which refers to c. 2, d. 94, to c. 23, C. 24, q. 3 and to Dig. 50.7.18(17) itself (I use the edition 
Decretum Gratiani cum Glossis domini Johannis Theutonici [...] et annotationibus Bartholomei 
Brixiensis [...], (Basileae: Frobenius 1512), 3vA). 
6 See the gloss destinati on Dig. 5.1.2.3 (I use the edition Corpus iuris civilis, 5 vol. (Lyon: Hugues de la 
Porte 1558-1560), vol. I, col. 527) and the passage from Bartolus’s Tractatus repraesaliarum quoted 
infra, n. 8. 
7 See Bartolus a Saxoferrato, Omnia, quae extant, opera, 10 tomes (Venetiis: apud Iuntas 1590), t. VI, 
153vA, no 2 (on Dig. 48.4.1), and 164rB, no 1 (on Dig. 48.8.3.6). See also Baldus Ubaldi, In Decretalium 
volumen Commentaria (Venetiis: apud Iuntas 1595 [reprint Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, Torino 1971]), 
101rB-101vA, nos 1, 8-9 (on c. 1, X 1.29). 
8 See Bartolus a Saxoferrato, Omnia, quae extant, opera 1590 (n. 7), t. I, 151rA, nos 1-2 (on Dig. 5.1.2.3), 
as well as Id., Tractatus repraesaliarum, ibidem, t. X, quaestio VII, ad septimum, 123vA, no 11. See also 
Giovanni da Legnano, De Bello, De Repraesaliis et De Duello, ed. by T.E. Holland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1917), 165, and Baldus de Ubaldis, Lectura super Infortiato, (Venetiis: [n.p.] 1494), 
unpaged (on Dig. 27.1.41(44).2). 
9 See Bartholomaeus de Saliceto, Lectura super toto Codice (Lugduni: [n.p.] 1485), unpaged (on Cod. 
4.61.8). 
10 Jurists based this argument on Cod. 2.53.1 and Dig. 29.2.30.pr. (for the restitutio in integrum and the 
absence rei publicae causa), and on Dig. 5.1.2.3-5 (for the ius revocandi domum). See Fedele, Naissance 
2014 (n. 1), 262-284. 
11 This principle, established for crimes by Dig. 5.1.24.1, is cited by Gondissalvus de Villadiego, 
‘Tractatus de Legato’ [1485], in Tractatus de Universi Iuris, 18 tomes (Venetiis: Società dell’Aquila che 
si rinnova 1584), t. XIII, pars II, q.5, 280vA, n° 3. Previously, without referring explicitly to the Digest, 
Bernard de Rosier had emphasised this point: see Bernardus de Rosergio, ‘Ambaxiatorum Brevilogus’ 
[1435-1436], in Hrabar (ed), De legatis 1906 (n. 1), cap. 21, 21-22, and cap. 23, 23. The same principle is 
established for debts in Dig. 5.1.2.4 and Dig. 5.1.25. 
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native country12. Two reasons were given as the grounds for these privileges: first, the 
ambassador represents the person who has sent him, so any offence suffered by the 
former is suffered also by the latter13; he is, moreover, an official who through his 
actions is promoting the «communis utilitas», thus providing a universal benefit, one 
which goes beyond any particular advantages that may be derived by any one 
community14. 
Towards the middle of the 16th century the literature on the ambassador began 
to develop in its methodology. These changes involved a significant widening of the 
range of sources used and a growing emphasis on the importance of argument based on 
historical erudition; however, they did not initially lead to any substantial innovations in 
the way in which immunity was understood. An early example of this phase is found in 
the De immunitate legatorum, by the French humanist and printer Étienne Dolet, 
published in Lyon in 1541 in a volume which also included his De officio legati. While 
the latter is more concerned with diplomatic praxis, and is really meant as a handbook 
of practical advice for ambassadors, in the De immunitate legatorum Dolet clearly 
expresses his intention to speak not of immunities in his own time, but of those 
established by the Greek and Roman law15. To this end, he makes wide use of two types 
of source: for legal principles he turns to the Digest, for the exempla to the ancient 
writers (Thucydides, Caesar, Livy, Plutarch, Polybius, Cassius Dio, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, and Cicero) – usually, incidentally, without citing anything. So, other 
than illustrating the rules already stated by the ius commune jurists – embellished with 
examples from classical antiquity – this text brings nothing new to the consideration of 
diplomatic immunity. 
The same can be said of another text, published a few years later, the De 
legationibus libri quinque by the German jurist Konrad Braun, although it draws upon, 
and cites, not only Justinian and classical texts, but also those of the medieval jurists16. 
                                                
12 See the commentaries of Albericus de Rosciate, Bartolus, Baldus and Bartolomeus de Saliceto on Cod. 
4.63.4. 
13 See the passage from Baldus de Ubaldis cit. supra, n. 7, according to which the offence caused to any 
ambassador is punishable as an act of lese majesty. See also Lucas de Penna, Commentaria in tres 
posteriores libros Codicis Iustiniani (Lugduni: apud Ioannam Iacobi Iuntae F. 1582), 320B, nos 33-34, 
who refers to the fact that in canon law priests are seen as Christ’s ambassadors and also considers a war 
begun to revenge an offence suffered by an ambassador to be just. 
14 See Bernardus de Rosergio, ‘Ambaxiatorum Brevilogus’ 1435-1436 (n. 11), cap. 6, 8; cap. 23, 23; cap. 
26, 26; cap. 27, 26. 
15 See Étienne Dolet, ‘De immunitate legatorum’, in Id., De officio legati. De immunitate legatorum. De 
legationibus Ioannis Langiachi Episcopi Lemovicensis, texte établi, traduit, introduit et commenté par D. 
Amherdt (Genève: Droz 2010), 88-90: «Legati officio descripto, non abs re facere videbimur, si quaedam 
de legatorum immunitate annotemus. Levioris tamen conatus id ipsum est quam ut me dignum censeam. 
[...] Quare quae mox de legatorum immunitate sequentur, non ad nostrum tempus (nisi ut minimum) 
referantur, sed ad Graecorum Romanorumque leges, id est maiorum nostrorum, non posteriorum 
aetatem». On Dolet’s life and personality, see Michèle Clément (éd.), Étienne Dolet: 1509-2009 (Genève: 
Droz 2012). 
16 See Conradus Brunus, ‘De legationibus libri quinque’, in Id, Opera tria [...]. De legationibus libri 
quinque [...] De caeremoniis libri sex [...] De imaginibus liber unus (Monguntiae apud S. Victorem: Ex 
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Braun justifies diplomatic immunity on the grounds that the office of ambassador is an 
essential one for the administration of the res publica, and the fact that its fulfilment is 
obligatory for those upon which it is imposed, so that it cannot be allowed to be 
detrimental to them17. He then mentions the ambassador’s inviolability and the 
principles established by the medieval jurists regarding reprisals, taxes and privileges in 
civil affairs, as well as the punishment provided for in civil and in canon law for anyone 
who offends against an ambassador18, stressing the identification of the ambassador 
with his principal and the legitimacy of a war undertaken in retaliation for an offence 
suffered by an ambassador19. Braun’s remarks on contemporary practice are particularly 
interesting: under no illusions about rulers’ respect for the ius gentium, he laments that 
«this right, sacred as it may be, is today violated with impunity by many people, above 
all by powerful men»20. This is why he warns the ambassador to pay more attention to 
the power and customs of those to whom he is going to be sent than to the precepts of 
the law. He goes further, even adding that an ambassador who fears that his immunities 
are going to be violated is authorized to refuse his appointment and not to take part in 
that particular mission21. Yet, notwithstanding this last observation and the detail of the 
argument put forward, Braun’s treatise, too, follows the tradition of previous 
scholarship and offers no particularly original elements concerning the themes that have 
already been developed. 
Everything, however, is about to change, thanks to Ayrault’s contribution over 
the course of the 1570’s. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
officina Francisci Behem 1548). There is a French translation of this text: Conrad Braun, Les cinq livres 
sur les ambassades: à destination de ceux qui sont totalement appliqués à la chose publique, ou très 
utiles à ceux qui remplissent une quelconque magistrature, et agréables à la lecture, traduction, 
introduction et notes de D. Gaurier (Limoges: PULIM 2008). On Braun’s life and work see Maria 
Barbara Rößner, Konrad Braun (ca. 1495-1563). Ein katholischer Jurist, Politiker, Kontroverstheologe 
und Kirchenreformer im konfessionellen Zeitalter (Münster: Aschendorff 1991), and Guido Braun, ‘«Les 
Cinq livres sur les ambassades» de Conrad Braun’, in Andretta/Péquignot/Waquet, De l’ambassadeur 
2015 (n. 1), 269-290.. 
17 See Brunus, ‘De legationibus’ 1548 (n. 16), IV.1, 150: «Quoniam autem Legatorum non solum magna 
apud omnes gentes & honorabilis dignitas est, sed usque adeo etiam in omni Reipublicae necessarium 
officium: ut nulla rerum administrandarum sine Legationibus perfecta ratio constare possit. Unde & in 
muneribus publicis numeratur Legatio, quam inviti etiam publicae necessitatis causa subire coguntur». 
18 See ibidem, IV.1, 150-151; IV.2, 153-154; and IV.5, 162-164. 
19 See ibidem, IV.3, 158. 
20 See ibidem, IV.1, 151: «Quanquam videmus hoc ius quantumlibet sacrum, hodie tamen a multis 
praesertim Potentioribus, impune prophanari. Quippe a quibus Legati eorum quibus infensi sunt, nulla 
Iurisgentium habita ratione, violantur». 
21 See ibidem, IV.1, 152: «Proinde si me audis, quisquis es, qui Legationem obiturus es, consulo, ut 
primum omnium, non tam ad Iusgentium de non violandis Legatis, quam ad eorum, ad quos mittendus es, 
potentiam et mores respicias: Sicque non temere, sed bono cum iudicio, Legationem vel suscipias vel 
refuses». 
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Pierre Ayrault on diplomatic immunity 
We don’t know much about Ayrault’s life. He was born in 1536 in Angers, and 
began to study the humanities and philosophy at the University of Paris, then moving to 
Toulouse and afterwards to Bourges, where he studied law, listening to lectures by 
celebrated jurists like François Duaren, Hugues Doneau and Jacques Cujas. Between 
1558 and 1568 he practiced as a barrister in the parliament in Paris, before being 
appointed to the post of lieutenant criminel in the city of his birth. He was a Royalist 
and a Gallican, categorically opposing the rebellions of the Catholic League, promoting 
the privileges of the French church against the papacy and defending the principle of 
religious freedom22. All through his life, Ayrault succeeded in combining work in the 
courts of justice with scholarly historical research. The texts which we examine here are 
probably the most accomplished examples of his interests, both practical and erudite, as 
their titles suggest: the first edition of the Decretorum libri was actually called 
Decretorum, rerumve apud diversos populos ab omni antiquitate iudicatarum, libri 
duo: qui ad formam Digestorum & Codicis Iustinianei redacti sunt, Item usui forensi ac 
moribus Gallicis accomodati; and the full title of De l’ordre is De l’ordre et instruction 
iudiciaire, dont les Anciens Grecs & Romains ont usé en accusations publiques. 
Conferé à l’usage de nostre France. Although the two works differ in their content in 
that the first, recalling many sections of the Digest and the Code, is encyclopaedic in 
character, while the second focuses on the procedures and stages of criminal 
proceedings, they nevertheless share method and objective, since both try to clarify, 
through the use of numerous – often classical – examples, many of the questions still 
held to be actual and pressing, in order to give the discourse a practical value. 
 
a) immunity when crimes are committed during a mission 
It must immediately be pointed out that the evaluation of Ayrault’s 
observations on diplomatic immunity while on a mission is problematic: in fact, the 
1573 edition of the Decretorum libri and De l’ordre et instruction iudiciaire, published 
in 1576, offer two different – and even conflicting – solutions to the question, without 
giving us an adequate explanation for this change of opinion23. Indeed, in the 
Decretorum libri, after asserting the inviolability of the ambassador, Ayrault asks if he 
                                                
22 See Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire des hommes illustres dans la République des lettres, tome XVII 
(Paris: chez Briasson 1732), 327-336; and Céline Saphore, ‘Ayrault, Pierre’, in Patrick Arabeyre/Jean-
Louis Halpérin/Jacques Krynen (éd.), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, XIIe-XXe siècle (Paris: 
PUF 2007), 30-31. 
23 This problem is even more difficult to resolve because there are no detailed studies of these works 
which could clarify, even at a general level, the reasons for the evolution of Ayrault’s thought. While the 
originality of De l’ordre et instruction iudiciaire has been, briefly, noted ever since the pioneering studies 
by Ernest Nys, Les origines de la diplomatie et le droit d’ambassade jusqu’à Grotius (Bruxelles: 
Librairie Européenne C. Muquardt 1884), 41-42, and Id., Les origines du droit international (Bruxelles-
Paris: Alfred Castaigne-Thorin & Fils 1894), 347-348, the clear difference between the opinions 
expressed here and in the Decretorum libri has never been highlighted. On the doctrine set forth in De 
l’ordre et instruction judiciaire, see also Kenneth R. Simmonds, «Pierre Ayrault et le droit d’ambassade», 
Revue générale de droit international public, 64, 1960, p. 753-761. 
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should be punished for crimes committed during a mission24. In considering this 
question he quotes a «memorable passage» from the De bello Gothorum by Procopius 
in which the king of the Goths, Theodatus, having been reprimanded by envoys from 
Justinian, warns them that ambassadors only benefit from inviolability if they stay 
within the bounds of their office: «for men – he explains to them – have sanctioned as 
just the killing of an envoy whenever he is either found to have insulted a sovereign or 
has had knowledge of a woman who is the wife of another»25. Based on the fact that, 
according to Procopius, the Roman envoys responded not by claiming immunity, but 
simply by denying having committed the crimes of which Theodatus accused them, 
Ayrault concludes that ambassadors are definitely punishable for any crime committed 
while on a mission, thus upholding the decision previously reached by ius commune 
jurists26. 
Just three years after the publication of the Decretorum libri VI, in De l’ordre 
et instruction iudiciaire Ayrault put forward a contrary thesis to the one just examined. 
He comes to talk about the ambassador after having discussed the limits of jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by foreigners in general27. Right from the start he declares that 
in his discourse he is going to refer not to the Roman «legati provincialium», who 
«were subjects and citizens like the rest», but to the «legati hostium», that is the foreign 
envoys, «those called Heraux d’armes or Ambassadeurs in France»28. For the first time 
in the literature on the ambassador, Ayrault here historicizes the language of Justinian’s 
texts and thereby reveals them to be inadequate for the elaboration of the modern figure 
of the ambassador. In so doing, he argues differently to the medieval jurists, who 
confined themselves to establishing, either implicitly or explicitly, an equivalence 
between the legatus of these texts and the ambasiator of their time29. With this 
distinction, moreover, Ayrault also makes explicit the proximity, in terms of genus to 
species relationship, between foreigner and ambassador. This proximity, however, is 
                                                
24 See Aerodius, Decretorum 1573 (n. 2), liber VI, tit. XVI, cap. 7, p. 706: «Sed quid si Legatus deliquerit 
apud hostes, an nunquam iure in eum animadverti potest?» (this question is not raised in the 1567 edition: 
see Id., Decretorum 1567 (n. 2), lib. II, tit. 34, cap. 3, 413-415). 
25 See Procopius, ‘The Gothic War’, in Id., History of the Wars, ed. by H.B. Dewing (London-Cambridge 
(Mass.): William Heinemann LTD-Harvard University Press 1968), I.7, 61-63. Procopius says that after 
the king of the Goths had suggested an accord with Justinian to end the war with Byzantium, the emperor 
sent ambassadors to him, charged with agreeing the peace deal. But then in the meantime the outcome of 
a battle rekindled the hopes of victory of the Goths and Theodatus went back on his word: it was for this 
that the Roman ambassadors reproached him. 
26 See Aerodius, Decretorum 1573 (n. 2), liber VI, tit. XVI, cap. 7, 706-707: «Est locus memorabilis apud 
Procopium libro primo de bello Gothorum, ex caussa adulterii Legatum puniri & occidi posse, nam cum 
id Theodatus obiiceret Petro et aliis Legatis Justiniani Imperatoris, non recusant quin ex ea caussa in eos 
iure animadverti posset, sed falsum criminem esse dicunt quod obiiciebatur». 
27 See Ayrault, De l’ordre 1576 (n. 2), 51r: «Venons maintenant à considerer l’estranger qui porte nom 
d’Ambassadeur & de personne publique [...]». 
28 See ibidem. 
29 See Fedele, Naissance 2014 (n. 1), 541-542 for some references. 
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soon destined to vanish: while with regard to the foreigner Ayrault had referred to the 
maxim «actor sequitur forum rei, quod vel domicilio, vel delicto contrahitur», denying 
the right of a political authority to claim jurisdiction over him unless he has acquired 
domicile or committed a crime in its land30, with regard to the ambassador he instead 
asks himself whether this last enjoys the privilege according to which ratione delicti he 
does not acquire domicile in the country where he is and cannot therefore be subject to 
that country’s jurisdiction31. How does he answer this question? The «safest» opinion 
and that «most consistent with the doctrines and the traditions of the Ancients» is, he 
believes, that the «usefulness and need for» ambassadors in «human society» are so 
great that «they cannot be punished, or even have a hand laid upon them and be 
imprisoned, whatever crime they commit while in office»32. Stating that an ambassador 
is only inviolable for as long as he «stays within the bounds of his office» (and, 
consequently, allowing that he be punished «like any other ordinary foreigner» if he 
should «break the law or do anything that transgresses his office») now means to 
Ayrault to make «the Ambassador a private man, and his privilege vain and profane». 
Moreover, a man don’t have to be an ambassador, he points out, to expect not to be 
offended against as long as he offend against no one33. 
Ayrault presents three arguments to support his reconsidered opinion. The first 
is not new in the debate about ambassadorial immunity, although in the past it was used 
to ensure their inviolability and not to exempt them from punishment for crimes 
committed while on a mission. It is based on the need for an ambassador to guarantee 
international intercourse and on the «public status» that he derives «from the person 
who sends him», from the person «to whom he is sent» and from the «sort of business 
on which he is engaged»34. Without ambassadors, asks Ayrault, who would negotiate 
between one nation and another, between enemies, between neighbours, between allies? 
The «universal, public interest» which is obtained when peace is reached between 
adversaries cannot be sacrificed in order to punish an «individual’s crime»; furthermore, 
                                                
30 See Ayrault, De l’ordre 1576 (n. 2), 50r-50v: «Mais certes où l’estranger n’a contracté domicile avec 
nous, ne delinqué sus noz terres: c’est contre tout droict, contre le droict des Gens, contre la raison 
naturelle que nous puissions rien entreprendre par dessus luy comme ses Iuges. Bien le pouvons nous 
prendre au corps & le renvoyer en bonne & seure garde par devant son Seigneur, & deputer vers luy 
messagers ou Ambassadeurs pour le requerir de nous en faire la Iustice. Et s’il en estoit refusant, seroit 
iuste occasion de luy denoncer la guerre, ou d’entrer en un droict de Represailles pour se saisir de ses 
aultres subiects les premiers venus, iusques à ce qu’il nous eust rendu la Iustice, ou delivré l’accusé [...]. 
Mais aultrement c’est une maxime generale entre toutes nations [...] que Actor sequitur forum rei, quod 
vel domicilio, vel delicto contrahitur». For the history of the maxim, see Jochen Schröder, Internationale 
Zuständigkeit: Entwurf eines Systems von Zuständigkeitsinteressen im zwischenstaatlichen 
Privatverfahrensrecht aufgrund rechtshistorischer, rechtsvergleichender und rechtspolitischer 
Betrachtungen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1971), 229-232. 
31 See Ayrault, De l’ordre 1576 (n. 2), 51r-51v: «Voyons [...] s’ils [sc. the ambassadors] ont celà de 
privilege que ratione delicti ils ne contractent point de domicile & de demeure». 
32 See ibidem, 51v. 
33 See ibidem, 52r-52v. 
34 See ibidem, 52v. 
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to allow for ambassadors to be punishable would open the door to all kinds of possible 
abuse35. 
The second – also traditional – argument alludes to the ambassador’s 
representative function: it is because he «represents the person of the ruler» that he 
cannot be in any way offended against without the offence immediately being suffered 
also by his principal. In this case too, however, Ayrault takes his argument in a new 
direction, that of the theory of sovereignty, when he explains that the ambassador does 
not only enjoy inviolability, but cannot even be punished for his crimes. Precisely 
because he is a representative, explains Ayrault, punishing him means punishing the 
ruler who has sent him; but the latter «est solutus legibus» and can’t be called before 
any judge other than himself, since to be a «judge in his own cause» is one of the 
prerogatives of sovereignty36. 
 Ayrault’s third argument, finally, is where the originality of his thought on 
diplomatic immunity is really demonstrated. After commenting – albeit implicitly – on 
the principles of the Digest and the Decretum on the punishment provided for anyone 
who offends an ambassador, Ayrault uses the concept of legal fiction to introduce the 
argument that the ambassador is held never to have left his country and, consequently, 
the jurisdiction of his ruler: «les fictions en Droit se conforment & reglent comme la 
verité. Or est-il que l’Ambassadeur pour la franchise et liberté où il doibt estre, est 
pour tel tenu & estimé que s’il esoit personnellement entre ses concitoyens & amys»37. 
Although the term does not appear here, this passage is the first in which the principle 
of the ambassador’s «extraterritoriality» is formulated, explicitly conceived as a fiction 
which can exempt the ambassador from the jurisdiction of the authority of the country 
to which his mission has brought him38. Note that, in the terms in which it is defined by 
Ayrault, this is not a real privilege, accorded to the dwelling of the ambassador – a 
                                                
35 See ibidem, 53v and 55r-55v. 
36 See ibidem, 53r: «Les Papes, les Evesques, les Roys sont honnorez pour celuy duquel ils sont la vraye 
image: les Iuges, les Officiers, pour ceux dont ils tienennt les places: le serviteur fust-il mauvais, pour le 
maistre qui luy commande. Ainsi est-il de l’Ambassadeur: puisqu’il représente la personne du Prince, qui 
est sacrée, & dont le crime commis en son Estat s’appelle bien Perduellion, & lése-maiesté, mais commis 
en sa personne reçoit encore un aultre nom qui est de Sacrilege, comme si Dieu & la Religion mesmes 
avoyent esté blecez & offencez quand on le blece: il s’ensuyt bien que tant que l’Ambassadeur est en cest 
estat, il fault non pour l’honneur de luy, mais de son Prince, dissimuler & ne voir point les faultes qu’en 
son particulier il auroit faictes. Le punissant, vous puniriez aucunement le Prince en la personne de son 
Legat, qui de son chef n’a toutefois point delinqué, & lequel, qui plus est, où il auroit aucunement failly, 
faisant ou commandant, est solutus legibus, & ne peult estre puny pour estre traicté & convenu par devant 
Iuge quelconque si ce n’est luy. Car les Roys ont celà de maiesté qu’ils sont Iuges en leur propre cause». 
37 See ibidem, 55r. In the 1588 edition, Ayrault reformulates this passage as follows: «Car l’Ambassadeur 
vient sous la foy publique: sous asseurance qu’il ne sera offecé de faict ny de parolle: vient sous ceste loy 
commune, & privilege que tous octroient, qu’encores qu’il soit en pays d’ennemy, il y sera tenu pour 
absent, et pour present en son pays: qui est à dire, s’il est Ambassadeur par-devers nous, qu’il ne sera 
astrainct ny subiect à nos loix» (Ayrault, L’ordre 1588 (n. 2), 53r). 
38 See Edward A. Adair, The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
(London: Longmans Green 1929), and Montell Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity. A Study 
in the Origin, Growth and Purpose of the Law (Washington D.C.: John Byrne & Co. 1936). 
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privilege which caused huge debate, as soon as ambassadors began frequently to claim a 
right of asylum within their embassies – but rather a personal privilege, limited to the 
person of the ambassador. Even though he is abroad, explains Ayrault, he can make a 
will as if he were in his homeland; if war breaks out he preserves his liberty and, 
returning to his country, he does so as a free man, not due to the ius postliminii; 
similarly, if he commits a crime during his mission, it is considered to have been 
committed in his homeland, not wherever he actually is, so that it will be the magistrates 
of his native country who will judge him39. 
In the subsequent pages Ayrault does not develop this theory any further, but 
he does give some examples, of which one can be seen as particularly significant. It is 
that of the Roman ambassadors to the court of Theodatus included in the De bello 
Gothorum, which Ayrault now interprets very differently from the reading he gave in 
the Decretorum libri. After recalling the two reasons for which, according to the 
Theodatus, it would be possible to punish the ambassadors – either insulting a king or 
committing adultery – he now says that Procopius had clearly shown that the argument 
used by the king of the Goths was no more than a «trick and a cavillation» found «to 
assert, with some reason, so it seemed to him, that he had not violated the law of 
nations»40. And the reply given by the ambassadors, in which they said that they had not 
committed any crime, is interpreted by Ayrault as «a figure the rhetoricians call a 
concessive clause and supposition», which does not imply, in fact, that they did not 
consider themselves to be protected by the ius gentium. The law undoubtedly allows for 
the killing of an adulterer, and of a nocturnal thief too; moreover, the law of nature 
gives the power to «repel violence with violence», says Ayrault. But the ambassador, 
subject to such legal principles, would not enjoy any more security or liberty than the 
most humble subject of the land41. 
The ambassador therefore benefits from broad immunity, which appears to 
protect him whatever crime he commits during a mission. What, then, can the ruler of 
the host country do in such situations? Given these premises, there is only one possible 
solution: an ambassador cannot be imprisoned, but «someone should be sent to ask his 
principal for justice». The principal will then be expected to return his agent and hand 
him over to the ruler whom he has wronged. Although this is not made explicit in the 
text, it seems clear that decision can only be made by the principal and his refusal 
cannot be countered; such a refusal may possibly, it can be imagined, lead to a 
                                                
39 See Ayrault, De l’ordre 1576 (n. 2), 55r: «À ceste occasion il peult tester, à ceste occasion si (pour 
exemple) dict le Iurisconsulte, pendant qu’il est à Rome la guerre est denuncée, il demeure en liberté, 
retournant en son pays, il n’y r’entre point iure postliminij [see Dig. 26.1.15 and Dig. 49.15.12]. Aussi 
pouvons nous dire que ores qu’il eust delinqué à Rome, où le Romain delinqué en son endroict que tout 
celà se prenoit comme s’il fust avenu en son pays, non point à Rome, si bien que ny en l’un ne en l’aultre 
cas les Romains n’en estoyent Iuges». 
40 See ibidem, 57v-58r. 
41 See ibidem, 58r. 
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legitimate act of war against him42. There is only one exception to this procedure, and 
Ayrault identifies it after having acknowledged the existence of a new custom in the 
diplomacy of his time: the continuous presence of «ordinary [i.e. resident] 
ambassadors» in European courts. Indeed, he accepts that a resident ambassador be 
deprived of his liberty for the time necessary to write to his principal to inform him of 
the crime that has been committed and to wait for the arrival of a new ambassador, who 
will have to be present at the intended trial of his predecessor. If the ambassador is 
condemned, the records will be communicated to his principal who will decide whether 
to recall him in order to inflict his punishment personally (but if the principal does not 
punish his ambassador, Ayrault makes explicit here, war may be declared against him) 
or to consent to his being punished by the authorities of the host country43. However 
this solution, which somehow shows how little the role of the resident ambassador was 
appreciated in the literature on the ambassador44, is toned down in the next edition of 
De l’ordre, published in 1588. Here Ayrault adds a short passage in which he says that 
«when there is doubt [...] it is better to act with greater dignity and caution, rather than 
to forgo them too readily»45. 
 Ayrault’s discussion is noteworthy not only for its richness but also for its 
originality, both in terms of the argumentation and of the solution identified, in 
redefining the limits of diplomatic immunity when a crime is committed during a 
mission. After the publication of De l’ordre et instruction iudiciaire this question was 
brought to general attention and was, for more than a century, the subject of great 
debate within the literature on the ambassador. While on the one hand diplomatic 
practice bore witness to the existence of a very wide ranging immunity for ambassadors, 
on the other, diplomatic theory, at least initially, revealed broad diversity of opinion, 
ranging from the extreme of declaring an ambassador fully responsible for crimes 
committed while on a mission (as asserted in an anonymous text entitled Quaestio 
                                                
42 See ibidem, 58v: «Il fault [...] en envoyer demander Iustice à son Seigneur. & quant à luy son debvoir 
est de le renvoyer & delivrer à ceux contre lesquels il a failly». The possibility of retaliating for an 
offence by declaring war is explicitly stated soon afterwards in the case of a resident ambassador: see the 
passage quoted in the following footnote. 
43 See ibidem, 58v-59r: «Toutefois pour le iourd’huy que les Princes ont leurs Ambassadeurs ordinaires 
les uns pres les aultres, on se peult asseurer de leur personne, puis escrire à leur Prince: leur envoyer 
autant des charges & informations: lesquels cela faict depecheront un aultre Ambassadeur, en la presence 
duquel sera faict & parfaict le proces à l’accusé, & iceluy proces derechef envoyé à leur Seigneur. S’ils 
mandent qu’on le punisse, faire se pourra: s’ils insistent qu’on le leur envoye, il me semble qu’on le doibt 
faire & le leur envoyer en bonne & seure garde. Que s’ils n’en faisoyent punition, il y auroit occasion de 
leur denuncer la guerre». 
44 See Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Baltimore: Penguin Books 1964 [1st ed. 1955]), 206 
and 235, and Fedele, Naissance 2014 (n. 1), 591-602 for some references. 
45 See Ayrault, L’ordre 1588 (n. 2), livre Ier, 56r [but 58r] where, after stating that «à l’endroit de tels 
Legats, plus honorables que necessaires, il n’y auroit pas lieu de tant de formalité & de respect» so that it 
would be possible to arrest them, Ayrault writes: «Toutesfois en chose doubteuse, & dont il peut 
facilement reüssir de l’inconvenient: il vaut mieux y apporter plus de solennité & de scrupule, que de s’en 
dispenser trop aisement». 
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vetus, et nova in 1606)46 to a concept of extraterritoriality proposed in terms similar to 
those of Ayrault (by Hugo Grotius, for example)47. Although this latter thesis only very 
gradually gained traction – and in varied forms – from the end of the 17th century, 
Ayrault deserves credit for having been the first to give it clear expression48. 
 
b) objective conditions which lead to immunities being lost  
Having dealt with the question of diplomatic immunity for crimes committed 
during a mission, we can now mention another original element introduced by Ayrault 
to the debate about diplomatic immunity – i.e. the evaluation of the consequences for 
immunity not of ambassadorial behaviour but of certain objective conditions over which 
he has no control. Ayrault examines these issues in the pages on the ambassador in his 
Rerum ab omni antiquitate judicatarum Pandectae (1588), where two conditions in 
particular can be considered especially relevant to our topic. 
As for the first condition, Ayrault begins by asking whether ambassadors are 
only inviolable in the country to which they have been sent, or whether in fact that 
inviolability applies wherever they are, and therefore also in the countries through 
which they travel. On this point he has no hesitation in turning the ius commune jurists’ 
opinion on its head: according to him ambassadors are not entitled to universal 
inviolability49. His argument is based, for once, on an example drawn from recent 
history and, in fact, destined still to be the subject of heated debate in the literature on 
the ambassador. It regards the case of Antonio Rincón and Cesare Fregoso, the agents 
of Francis I who, possibly on the orders of Charles V, were killed on the 3rd of July 
1541 near Pavia while on their way to Venice, where Fregoso was supposed to negotiate 
                                                
46 See Questio vetus, et nova: An Legatum adversus Principem vel Rempublicam ad quam missus est, 
delinquentem salvo Juregentium capere, retinere, ac punire liceat?, (Argentorati: sumptibus Lazari 
Zatzneri Bibliopolae 1606) (in the same year another edition was published in Paris). The pamphlet 
concludes with these words: «Quae cum ita sint, concludimus Legatum delinquentem (ac multo magis 
comitem ejus) citra jurisgentium injuriam contemptumve licenter capi, retineri, ac puniri ab ejus Principis 
magistratu cujus Majestatem Imperiumve laesit» (ibidem, 62). 
47 See Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Parisiis: apud Nicolamum Buon 1625), II.18.4, 371: 
«[...] omnino ita censeo, placuisse gentibus ut communis mos qui quemvis in alieno territorio existentem 
eius loci territorio subiicit, exceptionem pateretur in legatis, ut qui sicut fictione quadam habentur pro 
personis mittentium [...] ita etiam fictione simili constituerentur quasi extra territorium». 
48 A more detailed discussion can be found in Adair, The Exterritoriality 1929 (n. 38), chap. 1 and 2; 
Linda Frey/Marsha Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 
1999), chap. 5 and 6; Giuseppina De Giudici, ‘Sullo statuto dell’ambasciatore’, Teoria e storia del diritto 
privato 5 (2012), 1-32; and in Fedele, Naissance 2014 (n. 1), p. 296-319. 
49 See Aerodius, Rerum 1588 (n. 2), liber X, tit. XV, cap. 18, 449v-450r: «An aliis etiam omnibus quam 
ad quos missi sunt Legati, sint inviolabiles, quaestio est non negligenda. [...] Quid dicemus? an caussam 
religionis separari a prophana? & Deorum immortalium Legatos [...] ab Gentium, hominumque? nam qui 
ad Deum mittitur, quocunque mitti: & religionis caussam communem esse». By these words, actually 
concerning Greek θεωροί (on which see Costas M. Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996, p. 51-53, and Bash, Ambassadors 1997 (n. 3), ad 
indicem), Ayrault is maybe referring to papal legates and to ambassadors sent to the pope, as later 
Albericus Gentilis, De legationibus libri tres (Londini: excudebat Thomas Vautrollenrius 1585), I.3, 6. 
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a league with the Serenissima against the Emperor and Rincón was intending to 
continue on to the Sublime Porte. The Imperials had immediately justified the murder 
by denying that the two men were actually ambassadors, portraying them instead as 
rebels and spies in the pay of the French king who had been rightfully punished for their 
attempt to arrange for infidel attacks against Christendom. Francis I, in turn, denouncing 
the episode as an unprecedented crime, used it as an excuse to restart the war against the 
Emperor that had halted three years earlier, after a truce signed in Nice50. Although he 
sides with his own king, Ayrault explains that this case is not a violation of ius gentium, 
since the ambassadors’ enjoyment of their status and its privileges is not absolute, but 
operates only in relation to the receiver of their mission. In his opinion it is actually the 
breaking of the truce which, not having been salvaged by the handing over to the French 
king of the guilty parties, entitled Francis I to go back to war with Charles V51. The 
above case demonstrates that Ayrault’s tendency is not always to widen the scope of 
ambassadorial immunity beyond that of medieval scholarship, but also, on occasion, to 
narrow it. In this passage from the medieval sanctitas, valid erga omnes, to modern 
inviolability, one may recognize the effects of both the crisis of medieval universalism 
and the incipient state territorialisation, as well as the clear weakening of the idea that 
the ambassador is an agent whose duty it is to realize the publica utilitas over and above 
the interests of individual rulers or states: in this context, the ambassador becomes more 
like the agent of a ruler whose interests he has been charged with defending at the court 
of another52. 
As for the second condition, Ayrault asks whether, if there were an internal 
revolt, the envoys of the different factions and of the rebels should be considered as 
genuine ambassadors and should therefore enjoy ambassadorial privileges: this was 
undoubtedly a burning question in the France of the late 1580s, plunged deep in civil 
war. In his 1573 edition Ayrault had confined himself to writing to the effect that 
subjects and rebels can send envoys, but these are not «ambassadors» and do not enjoy 
                                                
50 On this episode, see Jean Zeller, La diplomatie française vers le milieu du XVIe siècle d’après la 
correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier évêque de Montpellier ambassadeur de François Ier à Venise 
(1539-1542) (Paris: Hachette 1880), 239-266. For the discussion of this episode in the literature on the 
ambassador, see Fedele, Naissance 2014 (n. 1), ad indicem. 
51 See Aerodius, Rerum ab omni antiquitate judicatarum Pandectae, cit., liber X, tit. XV, cap. 18, f. 450r: 
«Ergo Fregosio & Rinconeo, Legatis Francisci I Principis nostri, ad Venetios, & ad Turcarum 
Imperatorem, occisis sub ditione Caroli V non tam videtur ius Gentium violatum, quam ruptas inducias, 
sicariis nec deditis, nec punitis suis legibus, itaque iustam occasionem belli Carolum praestitisse». 
52 This is the reason why Ayrault emphasizes the obligation for the ambassador to follow his mandate to 
the letter; see Ayrault, Decretorum 1573 (n. 2), liber VI, tit. XVI, cap. 1, 701: «Legatorum hoc 
praecipuum munus, ne mandata egrediantur». See also Ayrault, Rerum 1588 (n. 2), liber X, tit. XV, cap. 
4, 446r: «Legatus vice est Principis, vice Reipublicae». 
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inviolability53. Fifteen years later, his position has changed: in fact he clearly affirms 
that when there is such discord in a state that only violence seems to be listened to, 
there’s no doubt that ambassadors are necessary and that they should therefore be 
inviolable54. On the other hand, when dealing with «subjects», who cannot actually be 
called «enemies» or «faction leaders», just «brigands» or «rebels», sending them 
ambassadors is not legitimate and their envoys do not enjoy the protection of ius 
gentium: the only possible choice they can make is to give up their weapons and sue for 
peace, or put their trust in victory rather than negotiation55. In this discussion a 
distinction becomes evident: as long as the institutional foundations of the state and the 
political and ideological ties on which the unity of the population are based are not 
irredeemably compromised, there is no alterity which would allow for abandoning the 
rule of ius civile and entering that of ius gentium. Only when this alterity exists are the 
rebel factions warranted to send ambassadors enjoying all the diplomatic privileges in 
ius gentium. We see therefore that ius gentium is on the way to becoming no longer a 
body of legal institutions common to all peoples, but a specific area of law which 
regulates the relations between states: a ius inter gentes, as Richard Zouche will call it 
in the title of his famous book56. At the same time, diplomacy is establishing itself as a 
field of activity focused exclusively on foreign lands, and as a prerogative of sovereign 
states – actually one of their most important prerogatives57. This distinction between ius 
                                                
53 See Ayrault, Decretorum 1573 (n. 2), liber VI, tit. XVI, cap. 8, 707-709: «[...] quaeritur, [...] an subditi 
& rebelles ius legationis habeant, hoc est, an mittere legatos, & ad eos mitti possint. Profecto quidem 
mitti possunt, sed dubitatio est an sint Legati, & sacrosancti atque inviolabiles». From the examples (all 
from antiquity) which he offers in the following lines, it seems clear that for Ayrault these envoys do not 
qualify as ambassadors and do not enjoy inviolability. 
54 See Aerodius, Rerum 1588 (n. 2), liber X, tit. XV, cap. 23, 451r: «Cum in Republica eo progressa 
dissensio est, ut arma emineant: quin eo etiam casu Legati sint valde necessarij, & quin inviolabiles 
debeant esse, nulla profecto dubitatio est». 
55 See ibidem: «At si ij sunt subditi, ut nondum vel hostes, vel Partium Duces possint appellari: sed 
duntaxat aut latrones aut rebelles: neque ad eos Legati mittendi sunt, neque missi ab iis, iure Gentium 
utuntur. Subditi (inquit Cicero ad Plancum) aut positis armis pacem petere debent: aut si pugnantes eam 
postulent, victoria pax, non pactione parienda est». 
56 See Richard Zouche, Iuris et iudicii fecialis, sive, iuris inter gentes, et quaestionum de eodem explicatio 
[1650], ed. T.E. Holland [The Classics of International Law] (Washington: Carnegie Institute 1911). On 
the notion of «ius inter gentes», see Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Osservazioni sul concetto di diritto 
internazionale di Gentili’, in Alberico Gentili nel quarto centenario del De Jure Belli, [Atti del Convegno 
Ottava Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio-Macerata, 26-27-28 Novembre 1998] (Milano: Giuffrè 2000), 
131-143. 
We may also remember that, according to Grotius, the right to send and receive ambassadors belongs in 
principle only to sovereigns («qui summi imperij sunt compotes inter se»); he adds however: «In bellis 
vero civilibus necessitas interdum locum huic iuri facit, extra regulam, puta cum ita divisus est populus in 
partes quasi aequales, ut dubium sit ab utra parte stet ius imperij [...]. Nam hoc eventu gens una pro 
tempore quasi duae gentes habetur» (Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 1625 (n. 47), II.18.2, 367). 
57 See Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République (Paris: chez I. du Puis 1583), I.10, 224: «Mais d’autant 
que le mot de loy est trop general, le plus expedient est de specifier les droits de souveraineté compris, 
comme i’ay dit, sous la loy du souverain: comme decerner la guerre, ou traicter la paix, qui est l’un des 
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gentium and ius civile is also evident in another passage, in which Ayrault argues that 
the killing of an ambassador within his own country entails the violation not of ius 
gentium, as would be the case if he were killed abroad, but of ius civile58. 
In this case the fact that Ayrault only uses examples from antiquity does not 
allow us to appreciate his thinking about contemporary events, although these questions 
were some of the most hotly debated of the time. One may remember that before him 
François Hotman had argued in favour of the application of ius gentium to the envoys of 
rebels in his Quaestionum illustrium liber, published in the aftermath of the St 
Bartholomew’s Day massacre. Jean Hotman, replying to the criticisms – based on a 
distinction between mere rebellion and civil war quite like Ayrault’s – made of his 
father by Alberico Gentili, would write that if the state is «divided into two factions», 
«as has happened recently in France», the very same laws would have to apply to 
citizens which are applied to foreigners, since «security is guaranteed to their deputies 
not for their own sake but for the public good» and the «salvation of the state»59. 
And so we see that Ayrault’s observations on the objective conditions which 
can result in an ambassador’s loss of immunity, which were to be picked up and 
elaborated upon over the course of the following century, have significant implications 
for the troubled transition from the medieval to the early-modern world. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This reconstruction of Ayrault’s thought on diplomatic immunity, while it 
could undoubtedly be further developed, nevertheless provides a considerable number 
of examples of the changes that occurred in the way in which the ambassador was 
                                                                                                                                          
plus grands poincts de la maiesté, d’autant qu’il tire bien souvent apres soy la ruine, ou l’asseurance d’un 
estat». 
58 This principle had already been stated by Aerodius, Decretorum 1573 (n. 2), liber VI, tit. XVI, cap. 8, 
707, in the context of a discussion on a case taken from the Declamatio 366 of the pseudo-Quintilian: 
«Rever[ten]tem Legatus quidam occidit. [...] Ergo exulem occidisse, sed nec quiem Legatum. Nam quod 
Legatus sacrosanctus est, hoc verum esse apud perduelles, non apud eos qui miserunt. [...] Certe Legatum 
non videri, quo violato non est violatum Ius Gentium, neque publica deditio competit. Atqui hic non 
posse dici, Ius Gentium violatum esse. Si quod ius violatum est, violatum est ius civile Romanorum». See 
also, in the same sense, Aerodius, Rerum 1588 (n. 2), liber X, tit. XV, cap. 22, 450v-451r. 
59 See François Hotman, Quaestionum illustrium liber ([n.p.]: excudebat Henr. Stephanus 1573), q. 7, 55; 
Gentilis, De legationibus 1585 (n. 49), II.7, 53-54; and Jean Hotman, L’ambassadeur ([n.p.]: [n.p.] 1603), 
chap. 3, 95-97: if the number of «sujets rebelles & seditieux [...] estoit grand, comme dernierement en 
France, & que l’Estat se trouve divisé en deux factions & le party formé en une guerre ouverte: puis que 
par le droit de guerre, mesmes entre les nations estrangeres & barbares, les Herauts & Ambassadeurs sont 
en sauveté: certes ceste loy doit valoir aussi bien pour les citoyens divisez que pour les estrangers 
ennemis d’un Estat. [...] Car l’asseurance qu’on donne aux personnes qu’ils deputent n’est pas en leur 
faveur, mais en la consideration du bien public, & pour les ramener au devoir, afin de faire cesser le 
trouble de l’Estat. Quod est necesse turpe non est, la necessité n’a ny loy ny honte. Et c’est icy aussi que 
ceste belle & ancienne maxime d’Estat doit avoir lieu Salus populi, suprema lex. Le salut de l’estat va 
dessus par toutes loix & toutes considerations [...] quoy qu’en die Albericus Gentilis en son traitté de 
legationibus, contre l’opinion de feu mon pere en ses Questions illustres». 
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conceived in the second half of the 16th century. Ayrault does not ignore the 
institutional changes that affected the figure of the ambassador, as is demonstrated not 
just by the specific observations about resident ambassadors, who can be kept under 
arrest for short periods, but also more broadly by the considerable attention which he 
pays to the conduct of the ambassador and the crimes with which he can tarnish himself 
during a mission. In this regard, as we have seen, Ayrault understands the need to 
ensure that diplomats are protected, without, however, foregoing the requirement that 
their principals punish any crimes they may commit. Moreover, the question of 
diplomatic immunity goes beyond the legal status of the ambassador and the privileges 
to which he is entitled, involving far wider political and doctrinal issues: consider the 
question of the right of legation, which was becoming ever more clearly the prerogative 
of sovereign states, and the definition of ius gentium, which, as the field of law which 
governed the foreign relations of states, was now increasingly distinguished from ius 
civile. Such issues, like the questions concerning the figure of the ambassador, would 
spark a debate to which countless words would be devoted during the 17th century. 
Ayrault therefore reveals himself to be a very significant author within the 
renewal which the scholarship on the ambassador underwent in the early-modern age. 
His new perspective results from an explicit distancing from Justinian’s texts both in 
terms of the lexis (with the introduction of a clear distinction between legatus 
municipalis or provincialis and legatus hostium) and in terms of rules (which are no 
longer cited, or, as demonstrated by the discussion of crimes committed by the 
ambassador while on a mission, are actually discarded). The legal reasoning is no longer 
based on the Corpus iuris civilis, but on analysis and discussion of examples from 
ancient (or, in some rare cases, modern) history. Moreover, it gives rise to the 
production of far more innovative solutions than those given by previous authors, like 
Dolet and Braun, despite the fact that they had used relatively similar methods. Indeed, 
these solutions present a number of points of contact with the theory of sovereignty for 
which, as is well known, another Angevin jurist was laying the foundations in those 
years, and which was to play such a large part in the political and legal scholarship of 
the following centuries. 
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